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Introduction 
The Conservative Party was the dominant political force in Liverpool from the mid-eighteenth 
century, and remained so until the middle of the twentieth century – as O’Leary notes, ‘By 1914, 
the Labour Party occupied only seven of a possible 140 seats on the city council, and it was only 
in 1955 that Labour achieved its first municipal majority in the city’ (O’Leary, 2004, p. 157). 
Despite Labour’s victory in the mid-1950s, the Conservatives averaged 49.8 per cent of votes cast 
in local elections in Liverpool in that decade and 51.1 per cent in the 1960s. However, this 
domination was not to survive the 1970s. In 1972 the Conservatives lost control of the council for 
the final time and in 1987 failed to return a single councillor. Today, Liverpool is a by-word for 
anti-Tory sentiment. Indeed, so implausible is the idea that the Conservatives could be electorally 
successful in Liverpool that following the city’s 2012 mayoral election, BBC Radio 5 Live reported 
that the Conservative candidate was defeated by a rival dressed as a polar bear (Morse, 2012). 
Whilst incorrect, the Conservative candidate still finished a humiliating seventh on 4.49 per cent 
of the vote to Labour’s 59.33 per cent. 
The purpose of this paper is to outline the causes of Conservative decline in Liverpool, a topic 
which has received remarkably little academic attention – perhaps due to the popular myth that 
Margaret Thatcher was the root cause of the phenomenon. The simplicity of this response has led 
to its elevation as ‘common sense’ but, as will be shown below, the decline began before Thatcher 
was elected party leader, let alone prime minister. Indeed, although decline intensified under 
Thatcher’s premiership, by 1979 the Conservative Party had already fallen significantly from its 
post-war high and was no longer one of the major players in Liverpudlian local politics. 
This article argues decline was a result of changing patterns of voter socialisation, national political 
issues in the guise of the unpopularity of the Heath government, and the rise of the Liberal party 
in the city which squeezed the Conservative vote. This Liberal rise is itself dependent upon two 
further factors: public dissatisfaction with the closed party machines in the city, and the innovative 
use of ‘pavement politics’ by the city’s Liberal Party. While there was nothing inevitable about the 
Conservative decline in Liverpool these factors came together in a ‘perfect storm’ in 1973 when 
the whole council was up for election to produce a surprising Liberal victory largely at the expense 
of the Conservatives. This result allowed the Liberals to create a new narrative, placing themselves 
as the main opposition to Labour in the city and on that basis squeeze the Conservative vote in 
most of the city’s wards. By contributing an account of why the Conservative Party declined in 
what was once an inner-city stronghold, this examination provides part of the historical context to 
current debates within the study of British politics surrounding how the Conservatives can ‘win 
back’ urban and northern voters in England (Clark, 2014). A case study such as Liverpool also 
shows the need for greater nuance when discussing Conservative decline in the North of England 
more broadly (Randall, 2009), whilst also providing new material for comparison to other areas of 
Conservative decline, the most obvious being Scotland (Kendrick and McCrone, 1989; Seawright 
and Curtice 1995; Finlay, 2012). 
This analysis begins with a brief contextualisation of the Liverpool Conservatives’ position in the 
city, focusing on local election results. This is followed by an examination of the factors related to 
the Conservative decline in Liverpool, namely the effect that socialisation had on Liverpool’s 
electorate, the influences of national politics, the local party structures in the city, and the rise of 
the Liberals through the use of ‘pavement politics’.  
Contextualising Conservative Decline in Liverpool  
For the purposes of this study electoral support will be measured via local elections rather than 
general elections. This is because there were local elections every year bar one for the main period 
of focus (1965-1975) which provides a greater range of empirical data about the support for each 
party, as well as showing that Conservative decline was not as unidirectional as one would believe 
by looking solely at general election results. The extent and scale of the decline of the Conservative 
Party in Liverpool is best illustrated graphically. Figure 1, below, shows the vote and seat share 
won in each local election between 1945 and 1996. 
FIGURE 1 - VOTE AND SEAT SHARE FOR LOCAL ELECTIONS IN LIVERPOOL, 
1945 – 96 
***FIGURE 1 HERE*** 
Source: Rallings, Thrasher and Ware 2006. 
Local politics in Liverpool can be split into three main periods. The first is between 1945 and 1970, 
when the vast majority of votes and seats were won by either Labour or the Conservatives, with 
the Liberals coming a distant third. Apart from two independents elected in 1945, and the single 
independent elected in 1946 and 1947, before 1970 all other seats were won by the Protestant 
Party. The Protestant Party stood in the northern St. Domingo and Netherfield wards unopposed 
by the Conservatives, and in return voted with them on most issues in the council chamber.  
Although more successful before 1939, they continued as an electoral force until the early 1970s. 
The party was disbanded in 1974, with most of their members joining the Conservatives. 
The second period is between 1970 and 1984, at the end of which the Conservative vote share had 
dropped beneath 20 per cent for the first time and from which it failed to recover. In this period, 
Liverpool Council was a three-party polity with no party able to exercise overall control; either the 
Labour Party, or the Liberals with inconsistent Conservative support, ran ineffective minority 
administrations. Conservative support became concentrated in the south of the city, with nearly 
half their vote situated in just six of the thirty-three wards by 1978 (Kilfoyle, 2000, p. 36-37). Thus 
they were able to return a respectable amount of councillors and remain in a ‘kingmaker’ position. 
The final period is from 1984 onwards. Conservative support continued to fall below 10 per cent 
and it was just as common for the party to win no seats than even one. Unlike in the country at 
large, the Conservatives were no longer able to hold on to their affluent, southern heartlands in 
the city and their vote share gained them little, if any, representation on the council. 
Hence, Conservative support in Liverpool can be understood thus: until 1970 the Conservatives 
were the main political party in the city, benefiting from the aldermanic system which often 
bolstered their majorities and kept them in power even when Labour had more councillors. For 
example, following the 1953 local election Labour had a majority of councillors (65 out of 120, to 
the Conservative’s 53), but due to the aldermanic system the Conservatives had a majority of votes 
on the council (81 out of 160, to Labour’s 72). From 1970 to 1984 the Conservative vote share 
declines, but instead of following the trends of the previous twenty-five years of cyclical support, 
the Conservatives fail to regain lost ground resulting in a slow decline. By 1984 the Conservatives 
were spent as a political force in the city, their decline evolving into seemingly permanent 
irrelevance. 
As previously mentioned, figure 1 shows how the Conservatives’ decline began long before the 
Thatcher era, with the party falling from an average vote share of around 50 per cent until 1970 
(and even higher if support for its sometime ally, the Protestant Party, is included), to 32.5 per 
cent between 1971 and 1979 inclusive. However, even during the Thatcher era, the average vote 
share was just shy of 20 per cent, which is significantly higher than the post-Thatcher era average 
of 6.3 per cent. Hence, we cannot look solely to Thatcher to explain the Conservative decline. 
Path Dependency and Socialisation 
While often thought of in isolation, path dependency and socialisation are interrelated phenomena. 
Path dependency can be understood as ‘social processes that exhibit positive feedback and thus 
generate branching patterns of historical development’, which, once established, reinforces a 
certain socialising tendency and becomes self-perpetuating, requiring a larger exogenous shock to 
change course (Pierson, 2004, p. 21). Pierson terms this ‘inertia’, whereby ‘Once such a process 
has been established, positive feedback will generally lead to a single equilibrium. This equilibrium 
will in turn be resistant to change’ (Pierson, 2004, p. 44). 
Socialisation is the process whereby an individual’s beliefs, outlooks, and other related values are 
shaped by the environment in which they find themselves. There is considerable evidence to 
suggest that the most important period of socialisation – where an individual is most receptive to 
environmental cues – is during their formative years (Green et al, 2002, pp. 107-108; Hooghe, 2004, 
p. 334). This idea has gained traction in the literature on voting patterns in Britain. Butler and 
Stokes found that ‘Children of parents who were united in their party preference were 
overwhelmingly likely to have absorbed the preference at the beginning of their political 
experience’ (Butler and Stokes, 1974, p. 51). Furthermore, Ball argues that ‘people form their views 
shortly before or during their young adult years, between the ages of around fifteen and twenty-
five, and thereafter do not greatly vary their fundamentals’ (Ball, 2013, p. 120). Thus we can 
establish a relationship between the social context one is brought up in and their propensity to 
vote in a certain way. 
There is great analytical value in understanding the phenomenon of socialisation within a path 
dependency framework. Returning to Pierson, we see that path dependency arguments ‘rest on 
what Stinchcombe has termed a conception of ‘historical causes’… some initial event or process 
generates a particular outcome, which is then reproduced though time even though the original 
generating event or process does not recur’ (Pierson, 2004, p. 45). This concept of historical causes is 
essential for understanding Conservative dominance in Liverpool since it explains to some extent 
why such a heavily working class city resisted Labour and provided fertile ground for the 
Conservatives. In the case of Liverpool this historical cause is religion and how it enabled 
Conservative dominance must be understood before we can understand Conservative decline. 
Liverpool is perhaps unique amongst the great English cities in the extent to which religion has 
played a role in its development.  For Baxter, religion in Liverpool ‘has dominated its political life 
and distorted it in a way that was unknown even in Glasgow – only Belfast can offer a comparison’ 
(Baxter, 1969, p. 1). The Great Famine in Ireland acted as a catalyst for huge amounts of Catholic 
Irish immigration into the city – at one point in the city’s history 25 per cent of the population 
were Irish-born – and the majority of those who stayed in Liverpool were either too poor or 
unskilled to make a life elsewhere. As a result, the city became geographically split along national-
religious lines (Baxter, 1969, pp. 1-2). 
The socio-religious split in the city, then, had emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century and 
broadly continued for at least a hundred years. Debate exists surrounding the extent to which the 
Conservatives stoked anti-Catholic sentiment in the city, with the majority of scholars writing on 
the period arguing that they did (for example Belchem, 2000, p. xvi-xvii; Lees, 2011, p. 124). For 
Waller it seemed ‘paradoxical that the Conservatives could be so successful, without being 
dishonest, in Liverpool, given the grim circumstances in which much of the population lived and 
worked’ (Waller, 1981, p. xix). However, O’Leary argues that the view that sectarianism ‘retarded 
the natural development of a unified working-class consciousness and, consequently, the forward 
march of Labour’ represents a ‘rather one dimensional, sectarian account of Liverpool’s political 
history’ (O’Leary, 2004, p. 158). Davies comes to a similar conclusion as O’Leary in his study of 
the Liverpool Labour Party in the interwar years, finding that ‘religious sectarianism was almost 
certainly not as important as twentieth-century convention has made it out to be, but it was still 
relevant’, and that the Conservatives only used anti-Catholic sentiment in a few wards, where even 
there ‘the sectarian appeal was not a major factor consistently throughout the inter-war years’. 
Labour’s electoral nadir in the city, in 1930 and 1931, are found to be down to national crises 
rather than local sectarianism (Davies, 1996, p. 233). 
Regardless of whether the Conservatives played on religious divides, the fact remains that the party 
could usually rely on strong, working-class Protestant support in the city. One of the most 
politically salient issues in Liverpool was the issue of Irish Home Rule, whereby those against 
Home Rule tended to vote for the Conservatives, whilst those in favour tended to vote for the 
Irish Nationalist Party (in its various guises). The strength of the Catholic Nationalist vote can be 
seen in the fact that Liverpool contained the only constituency outside of Ireland to return an Irish 
Nationalist MP – T. P. O’Connor, who represented Liverpool Scotland. As such, the potential for 
Labour to reach either the Protestant working-class or the poorer Catholic working-class was 
heavily restricted before the 1920s. Murden argues that Labour only started to ‘emerge as a 
significant force after it merged with the Catholic Centre Party in 1928’, the consequences of which 
are spelt out later (Murden, 2006, p. 448). 
The final political force in the city, the Liberals, failed to become as successful as the Conservatives 
due to their support for Irish Home Rule, which alienated Protestants, whilst Catholics felt better 
represented by explicitly Catholic parties. As such, Liberal support was reliant upon a smaller, 
squeezed, electoral base of artisans and large business owners. Furthermore, the Liberals appeared 
aloof, in stark contrast to the ‘man of the people’ approach taken by prominent Tories. Belchem 
quotes the Daily Post from October 1861, which reported that the Conservatives ‘owed their 
mastery in municipal matters to their ready rapport with the electorate’, with electoral confidence 
leading to their being 
affable, kind and conciliating. There is about them what is called bonhommie [sic]. The 
leading Liberals, on the other hand, are somewhat imperious. They are not conciliatory; they 
repel rather than attract. In fact, they are far more exclusive than the Tories (quoted in 
Belchem, 2000, p. 174). 
Thus, 19th century Toryism in Liverpool ‘continued to thrive in the interlocking associational 
network – party, popular and sectarian – which facilitated ready interaction between the classes’ 
(Belchem, 2000, p. 174). This interaction was rooted in the Working Men’s Conservative 
Association, a vehicle which the Liverpool Conservative leader Alderman Salvidge, a self-made 
brewer and publican, aimed to transform into ‘a big name [with] lots of power, [to] make the city 
into a real democracy and show the masses how they can rule themselves’ (O’Leary, 2004, p. 166). 
O’Leary highlights that Conservative representatives were heavily involved in working-class 
pastimes, with both ‘Everton and Liverpool Football Clubs… founded thanks to the patronage of 
‘King John Houlding’ of Everton, a self-made publican and Tory councillor’ (O’Leary, 2004, p. 
169). 
As such, party political support in Liverpool in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was 
based on the religious divides between Protestant and Catholics, not class. Generally, the 
Protestant electors lent their support to the Conservatives whilst the Catholics backed the various 
Catholic parties and later the Labour party (Roberts, 1965).  
1918 is seen as the election when class had replaced religion as the main determinant of voting 
behaviour, but the effects of this were not instantaneous (Wald, 1983, p. 250; Butler and Stokes, 
1974, pp. 409-410). Whilst the replacement of religion with class in a city with Liverpool’s 
socioeconomic makeup would lead one to expect a massive surge in support for Labour, this did 
not occur. In the 1951 general election the Liverpool Conservatives polled 51 per cent to Labour’s 
49 per cent, by 1955 this lead increased to 52.5 per cent to 46.7 per cent respectively and in 1959 
it had grown further, to 53.4 per cent to 45.2 per cent respectively (Butler and Stokes, 1952, p. 
264; Butler and Stokes, 1955, p. 184; Butler and Rose, 1960, p. 218). However, whilst the direct 
importance of religion may not have declined in Liverpool as early as elsewhere, decline it 
eventually did. For Ramsden, this was evident by the 1964 general election, which he terms a  
historically significant milestone… traditional religious cleavages broke down with 
remarkable suddenness; without militant Protestantism Glasgow and Liverpool soon 
became almost no-go areas for Conservatives, who hung on to only four of the two cities’ 
twenty-four seats where previously they had held half of them; at Bebington, Geoffrey Howe 
saw a large majority shrink to marginal proportions as ‘people – even Irish people, on 
Merseyside at least – were more inclined to vote with their class than with their Church’ 
(Ramsden, 1996, p. 230). 
As previously mentioned, to focus on general elections, as Ramsden has, in Liverpool provides a 
unidimensional to Conservative decline and cannot account for the highs of 1969 or the sudden, 
dramatic decline in 1973. It also hides the fact that the Conservatives still won over 40 per cent of 
the vote in the next two general elections. Ramsden’s broader point, however, still stands; the 
direct link between Protestantism and Conservatism had been deteriorating. However, even 
though the direct relationship between religion and voting behaviour may have eroded, 
Stinchcombe’s concept of historical causes is useful to understand just why the Conservatives were 
able to continue to rely on such a large segment of working-class support in the city until the 
1970s.  
Political socialisation is most effective during one’s formative years, with parental leads and social 
milieu providing the most important cues. As such, a Liverpudlian child born into a working-class 
family may have been expected to vote Labour but if their parents were Protestants and from an 
era where Irish Home Rule was a salient issue it would be highly likely that the parents would 
support the Conservatives, and pass this Conservative support to their child. Furthermore, if the 
family lived in an environment which was heavily Conservative, perhaps due to being heavily 
Protestant (such as the Woolton or Warbreck wards), the environmental influences would also 
prompt the child to support the Conservatives. Hence, the historical cause of Protestantism would 
be the reason why the child supported the Conservatives, whilst socialisation would be the 
mechanism by which that support was transmitted through generations.  
For Ball, the socialisation of working-class Conservatives until 1945 was, on a national level at 
least, partly a result of Labour’s newness in the eyes of the electorate. Ball states that the  
pre-1935 age group were those whose socialization was in the period when the Labour Party 
was either marginal, untried, and possibly alarming (before 1923), or when it was a more 
significant force but not yet an established or successful party of government (1924-1935) 
[and that] only the Conservatives were credible contenders for power throughout the 
interwar era, a position which has always paid dividends for the party in attracting support 
from all social classes (Ball, 2013, p. 121).  
This view is supported by Butler and Stokes (Butler and Stokes, 1974, p. 185) and can be applied 
to the local level. Since the Conservatives were almost consistently in power from the mid-
nineteenth century they could be portrayed as the natural party of local government in Liverpool, 
with Labour yet to gain the legitimacy granted in 1945 and the Liberals a declining force.  
Clearly this pattern of socialisation could not continue indefinitely. Like a fast-moving bike on a 
flat road, without peddling eventually friction will slow it to a halt – and in this case the friction 
was provided by the national-level class socialisation patterns. Butler and Stokes noted that those 
who were socialised in a ‘politically homogenous’ environment ‘almost never seem to have 
deserted their parents’ party (Butler and Stokes, 1974, p. 65). Crucially, however, if an individual 
faces no partisan lead from their parents they tend to accept ‘the lead that is so clearly given in 
Britain by a class milieu’, whilst for those facing conflicting socialisation patterns (perhaps one 
parent or side of the family votes Tory) ‘the possibility of a change of preference became much 
greater’ (Butler and Stokes, 1974, p. 57; p. 65). However, over time, voters who supported one of 
the two leading parties at one election were ‘far more likely to shift towards the other party at the 
next election if this shift moved him towards the dominant opinion within his local constituency 
rather than away from it’ (Butler and Stokes, 1974, p. 140). This is perhaps to be expected, since 
both scenarios represent the path of least resistance. It does, however, emphasise the positive 
reinforcement aspect of the movement to Labour in the city; Labour’s increasing national 
dominance amongst the working class would serve to increase the reach and effectiveness of the 
socialisation of new voters, whilst those who faced competing socialisation pressures were more 
likely to switch towards their ‘natural’ party (based on class), usually Labour. Thus, the 
Conservatives were harmed twice-over by this trend; firstly, as class replaces religion voters would 
be more likely to support Labour initially, and those who changed their party allegiance would be 
more likely to move to Labour. 
Hence, religious identity mattered for Conservative socialisation in Liverpool; it provided the initial 
link between the working class and Conservative voting, and was the ‘historical cause’ for parental 
and neighbourhood socialisation which sustained Conservative support after 1945. Due to the 
strength of religious feeling in Liverpool this continued longer than it would have in other cities, 
and certainly longer than one would expect given the economic and demographic makeup of the 
city. However, over time the national-level socialising effects of class eroded the number of new 
Conservative voters, until they became concentrated in the southern, affluent wards of the city. 
Thus, one aspect of the Conservatives’ surprising strength in the city before 1970 can be attributed 
to socialisation patterns, as can the long term decline. This, however, does not explain the sudden 
increase in Conservative support in the mid-1960s nor the sharp decline in the party’s fortunes 
from 1970 onwards. Thus we must look at factors exogenous to the path dependent socialisation 
model given here, specifically the role that national politics played on local election results.  
National Inf luences 
In order to explain the short term swings away from a general trend of Conservative decline, we 
must look beyond the socialisation thesis and move to other influences on voting behaviour – the 
most obvious being the behaviour of politicians. Though academic work on analysing election 
results and political opinion in Liverpool is sparse there is a limited amount of information 
available in the two local newspapers in circulation at that time, the Liverpool Echo and the Daily 
Post. Although the analysis is not extensive there is sufficient material available to paint a picture 
of how national level events impacted on local election results to explain the impressive 
Conservative rise and fall between 1965 and 1975. The picture painted below also chimes with 
evidence provided by an internal investigation into why the Liverpool Conservatives fared so 
poorly in the 1962 local elections, where in many wards national issues overshadowed local issues 
(“Report on Municipal Elections”, 1962).    
Perhaps unsurprisingly (and not altogether unreasonably), there is a consistent pattern of Labour 
and the Conservatives attributing their defeats to the unpopularity of their respective party in 
government, a view broadly shared by their rivals. For example, discussing Labour’s 1965 defeat 
Alderman Sefton, the council and Labour group leader, claimed  
It is evident that the difficult and unpopular decisions the Labour Government has had to 
take in order to rectify the effects of the neglect of our economic affairs arising from the 
failure of the last Government to tackle the problems in time has led to a feeling of 
frustration among some people. 
Alderman Steward, leader of the Conservative Party, agreed that dissatisfaction with the national 
government was a factor (Daily Post, 14 May 1965). This victory was reflective of a general national 
trend towards the Conservatives which continued until 1970. Whilst in 1965 and 1966 the issue of 
comprehensive education was a billed as an important factor in local politics by the Conservatives, 
turnout remained low which suggests that local passions were not aroused by the issue (Daily Post, 
15 May 1966). 
Whether this swing to the Conservatives was the result of Conservative popularity or a reduced of 
turnout of Labour voters is a pertinent question. For the Daily Post, the answer was clearly the 
latter; ‘the uncomfortable fact remains that hardly anywhere have the Conservatives actually 
increased their total poll… it is abstentions rather than actual desertions that are troubling the 
Labour Party – and to a lesser extent the Liberals too’ (Daily Post, 15 May 1965). Regardless, in 
1967 the Conservatives took control of the council and Alderman Sefton again repeated the refrain 
that his party’s losses were a result of discontent ‘with the Government’s economic policies’ 
(Liverpool Echo, 12 May 1967). This view is supported by the Liverpool Echo’s editorial, which stated 
‘As elsewhere in the country, the political change in Liverpool City Council is chiefly the product 
of a protest vote against Government, not local, policies’ (Liverpool Echo, 12 May 1967). Meanwhile 
the Liberals were still floundering, their total votes falling from 8,129 in 1966 to 6,493 in 1967 
despite having one more candidate in 1967 (Daily Post, 12 May 1967). 
After securing control of the council, 1968 saw a further Conservative victory with successes 
reported in all parts of the city leading the Liverpool Echo to claim that ‘if a General Election were 
held now and produced the same result, Liverpool would be an all-Conservative city’ with local 
issues of little importance (Liverpool Echo, 10 May 1968). Opposition to a proposed motorway line 
was the basis of an attempt by the Liberals to whip up local fury, but ‘to no avail’ (Daily Post, 10 
May 1968). Furthermore, the Liverpool Echo argued that low turnout was because ‘the hearts of 
erstwhile Labour supporters must be heavy’ due to the Conservatives’ national lead in the polls, a 
view shared by the Daily Post (Liverpool Echo, 10 May 1968; Daily Post, 9 May 1968). By 1969, Labour 
numbered just ‘41, including 18 aldermen’, and ‘Not since 1951, when Labour’s total strength on 
the council was 40, has the picture looked so gloomy’ (Liverpool Echo, 9 May 1969). The Daily Post 
believed that  
‘even the leaders of the major parties in Liverpool City Council don’t see any major issues 
to fire the electors’ enthusiasm… This must drive some to vote on national party issues, 
which is always a poor approach to local polls, and others to stay away altogether’ (Daily 
Post, 7 May 1968). 
As such, we can see that informed opinion pinned the majority of the Conservative gain on 
dissatisfaction with the national government. What is important to note, however, is that the 
Liberals did not seem to benefit from this dissatisfaction at all – by 1969 they had just 3 seats – 
since Labour voters chose to stay at home, rather than transfer allegiance to the Liberals. This can 
be attributed to the fact they were not perceived as a serious contender by many, they failed to 
have a distinctive policy programme and did not stand a full slate of candidates until 1975 so many 
voters could not vote for them even if they wanted to.  
However, with Heath’s victory in 1970, the effects of dissatisfaction with national politics on local 
election results began to work against the Conservatives. 1970 saw a swing to Labour in the local 
elections, and analysis by Alderman Steward found that ‘The outstanding feature of the election is 
the great increase in the Labour vote. It will be noted, however, that the Tory support is not 
dropping, but that discontents of the Labour movement are coming back to their support’ 
(Liverpool Echo, 8 May 1970). 63,955 people voted Labour in Liverpool in 1970, compared with 
35,940 in 1969 whilst the Conservative vote actually increased by 329, from 72,255 in 1969 to 
72,584 in 1970 (Liverpool Echo, 8 May 1970). 1971 saw further Conservative decline, with their 
council majority reduced to 25 and their vote reduced to 48,040, compared to Labour’s 80,761. 
For Alderman Steward, ‘There is little doubt that once again the electors are voting against the 
government of the day’ (Liverpool Echo, 14 May 1971). By 1972, Labour were in control of the city 
on the back of a promise to not implement the Government’s Fair Rent Bill, with Alderman Sefton 
arguing that this, plus dissatisfaction with the government more generally, contributed to the 
Conservatives’ downfall (Liverpool Echo, 4 May 1972). Indeed, it is important to note that in these 
years of Labour victories, turnout was on average around 4 per cent higher than during the 
Conservative victories (6 per cent if the anomalous 1967 turnout figure is excluded), thus 
supporting the idea that Labour voters were more likely to turn out to register their dissatisfaction 
with the Conservative government. 
It is also important to note the growth in the Liberal vote, from 9,974 in 1969 and 11,381 in 1970 
to 18,972 in 1971 and 23,514 in 1972, suggests that many Conservative supporters felt able to do 
what Labour supporters in the late 1960s did not and register their dissatisfaction with the 
government by transferring their support to the Liberal party rather than abstaining. 
Following the Local Government Act 1972, the number of wards in Liverpool was reduced from 
40 to 33 and the aldermanic system was abolished. The whole council was up for election, with 
the Liberals unexpectedly winning a plurality of seats and coming just two short of a majority. 
Ironically the Conservatives, with just 9 seats and their lowest seat share in a century, held the 
balance of power. Again, Conservative failure was blamed on classic ‘mid-term blues’, and the 
effect of the Liberals’ effective local campaigning (Daily Post, 11 May 1973). 
However, by the next local election in 1975 Wilson was once again Prime Minister but the 
Conservatives gained just 5 seats compared to the ‘substantial Tory gains in the Metropolitan 
District Council elections’ across Merseyside, which the Liverpool Echo argued ‘will have come as a 
sharp warning to the Government that the electorate is far from pleased with the way things are 
going’ (Liverpool Echo, 2 May 1975). Thus, nationally, whilst dissatisfaction with a Labour 
government resulted in Conservative gains, this does not occur to any significant extent in 
Liverpool – which was especially concerning for the Conservatives since they had been expecting 
a swing back to them following the huge surge in support for the Liberals seen in the previous 
election.  
Instead, what can be seen is that since the Conservatives were defeated so significantly and 
suddenly in many wards in 1973, as a result of the whole council being up for election, that there 
was a shift in the narrative of Liverpool local politics. It was now the Liberals, not the 
Conservatives, who could legitimately claim to be a voter’s best chance of keeping Labour out and 
thus those who voted Conservative because they were anti-Socialist rather than pro-Conservative 
had another party for whom they could vote. As a result, the Conservative vote became 
increasingly concentrated in a few safe wards, whereas elsewhere the Liberals became the main 
opposition to Labour. This can be shown in the results of the 1976 local election, where the 
Conservatives won 6 seats on 45,410 votes, compared to the Liberals’ 13 seats on the lower tally 
of 40,283 votes and Labour’s 15 seats on 46,321 votes.  
Furthermore, Frost and North highlight how ‘Liverpool Liberals were closer philosophically to 
the Tories and their approach was consequently not attractive to many radicals in the city’, meaning 
that they took disproportionately more votes from the Conservative vote share (Frost and North, 
2013, p. 43). Kilfoyle shares this view, claiming  
the Liberals accumulated support from disillusioned Tories, in part delivered by a residual 
Protestant logic that equated the Liverpool Labour Party with the Vatican, and they also 
appealed to a fledgling constituency of owner-occupiers, potential owner-occupiers and 
private-sector tenants, many of whom had been ‘brought up’ Labour but had since begun 
to see little in the party to keep them loyal. (Kilfoyle, 2000, p. 29-30). 
It is important to note that Kilfoyle’s partisan leanings; he was the Labour North West Regional 
Organiser (1986-1991) and MP for Liverpool Walton (1991-2010). In this case, however, his 
political alignment does not detract from the point made, with his view is supported by the fact 
that the Conservatives’ slight electoral recovery in the mid-1970s took more seats from the Liberals 
than Labour, evidence that Liberal voters were previously Conservative voters. 
Thus, the ability of the Liberals to provide an alternative to the Conservatives put the final nail in 
the coffin of the Liverpool Conservatives. Unable to rely on Protestantism or socialisation to 
provide working-class votes, nor their claim to be the main anti-socialist party in Liverpool, the 
Conservatives began to suffer electorally. Indeed, their strength came in low turnout when Labour 
voters could not be bothered to vote, which is also one reason why Labour outperformed the 
Conservatives in general elections from 1964 onwards as general elections have much higher 
turnout than local elections. The importance of differing turnout levels between party supporters 
also explains how the Conservatives managed to maintain a high vote share despite the declining 
effects of socialisation. 
As such, the twin forces of the unpopular Heath government and the rise of the Liberals as an 
alternative opposition to socialism, coupled with a socialisation trend which favoured the Labour 
party, meant the Conservatives were doomed; the rotting foundations of their support had 
collapsed beneath them, and it was a fate from which they were unable to recover. 
The Liberal Rise: Party Machines and Pavement Politics 
The rise of the Liberal Party was nothing short of astounding. In 1969 they held just three seats 
but by 1973 they were only three seats short of a council. Some of the reasons for this rise have 
been mentioned previously but it is important to flesh out a full account of how this success came 
about. The causes are a mix of long and short term factors. In the long term the aforementioned 
weakening socialisation trends contributed to the decline of the Conservative electoral base whilst 
the closed party machines which were common in the city bred disaffection and a lack of 
engagement in local politics. In the short term, the Liberals’ – especially the Liberal Youth’s – 
emphasis on pavement politics was an effective campaigning strategy which allowed the Liberals 
to encourage voters to vote in local elections on local issues, rather than the national issues shown 
to be so important previously. 
The problem of closed party machines had plagued Liverpool for decades. As Baxter notes:  
In common with many cities in the United States of America, which have large Irish 
immigrant communities, Liverpool developed a political power structure that was not 
entirely in accordance with liberal democratic theory, and was out of line with the normal 
practice of British political parties. The leaders of both the Conservative and Labour Parties 
acquired unusual power inside their organisations (Baxter, 1969, p. 1). 
We can see evidence of this surfacing as early as 1936, in Conservative activist Wittingham-Jones’ 
series of biting pamphlets attacking the influence of the ‘Orange caucus’ on the Liverpool 
Conservative Party. She claimed that, following the enactment of the Corporation Schools policy,  
Liverpool Tories discovered that the talisman to electoral victories was the ‘Protestant 
ticket,’ and, so well did they learn their lesson that, long after it has ceased to be infallible 
they persist in thinking the magic of ‘No Popery!’ is still sovereign on Liverpool hustings 
(Whittingham-Jones, 1936, p. 37). 
The relationship between religion and politics had become too close for Whittingham-Jones, with 
entry into the Conservative Party machinery being ‘rigidly confined to Protestant electors’, for 
example through the practice in the Workingmen’s Conservative Clubs of ‘requiring members who 
have been guilty of ‘consorting’ with Catholics to confess their delinquencies and upon doing so 
they then receive a warning. Catholics who have strayed in by chance are requested to leave the 
room.’ She warned that the exclusion of Catholics reduced the party’s appeal to ‘the thousands of 
non-sectarian electors of all classes whom the Caucus deliberately avoids bringing in’ 
(Whittingham-Jones, 1936, p. 7-8).  
Powerful, popular, dominating party leaders, coupled with continued electoral success on the back 
of working-class Protestantism, led to numerous opportunities for the exercise of the power of 
patronage, resulting in the emergence of ‘boss politics’ within the Conservative party. Kilfoyle 
argues that historically ‘politics in Liverpool was managed primarily by a number of city ‘bosses’. 
Turn after turn, this was typified by the Conservative leaders Arthur Furwood, Archibald Salvidge, 
Thomas White and Alfred Shennan, and then Labour’s Jack Braddock’ (Kilfoyle, 2000, p. 22). For 
the Conservatives boss politics did not result in a detachment from voters whilst the 
Workingman’s Conservative Clubs were active until the mid-1950s, as this provided a link with 
their working-class base, but following their decline this legacy of bossism resulted in a 
Conservative Party which had very few roots in the local community. This lack of local roots was 
indeed recognised by the party itself, with the party’s Central Office Agent for the North West 
arguing in a confidential report in 1956 that ‘until recently no effort has been made to enlist 
members or carry out any of the organisational methods to which the Central Office attaches so 
much importance. Its Women’s, Y.C. [Young Conservative] and C.T.U. [Conservative Trade 
Unionist] sections are well below the average, there is no marked register and the amount of 
canvassing and doorstep work carried out is negligible’ (Banks, 1956). Similarly, the loss of the 
Church and St. Michael’s wards in 1962 to the Liberals was attributed to weak local organisations 
by the party’s own internal investigation (“Report on Municipal Elections”, 1962), a problem 
which had spread across the city by 1966 (Macdonald Steward, 1966). As such, the centralisation 
of power by Conservative bosses had served to consistently undermine the life of the various ward 
and constituency associations. 
For Labour, the cause of boss politics was clear. As previously mentioned, Labour only gained 
traction in the city when the Catholic Centre Party merged with the Labour Party in 1928, due to 
the Archbishop of Liverpool’s opposition to political groupings based on religion. As a result, this  
handed over to the Labour Party a substantial body of politically active working-class people 
who were not socialist; who indeed were not in politics for class reasons at all, but were 
involved for nationalist and religious reasons – motives that were basically irrelevant to the 
Labour Party (Baxter, 1972, p. 106).  
This was not overly problematic for the Labour Party, since during this time ‘the Catholicism of 
many electors and elected came before their Socialism. Labour inherited rather than won 
Nationalist seats’ (Waller, 1981, p. 324). Indeed, the strength of the Catholic vote is highlighted by 
the anecdote that, in 1931, the only seat which Labour didn’t lose in Liverpool was the ‘the 
imperishably Catholic Scotland division’ where the incumbent, David Logan, ‘was confident of 
beating all-comers, ‘from the Prime Minister downwards’’ (Waller, 1981, p. 328). 
For Kilfoyle, Labour councillors after 1945 were lacking the ‘experience of local government and 
the mix of pragmatism and ideology common in Britain’s other great cities, and influenced as it 
was by the more conspiratorial aspects of Irish politics, Liverpool’s Labour Party was deeply 
affected by Tory-bequeathed boss politics’ (Kilfoyle, 2000, p. 1-2). When Labour gained control 
of the council in 1955 the leader, Jack Braddock, continued the tradition of boss politics. Even 
when the Catholic councillors and aldermen were lost following the Conservative victory of 1961 
and their seats regained in 1963 by Labour councillors inspired by class rather than religion, this 
culture of boss politics continued (Baxter, 1972, p. 103). It was under Braddock, and his ‘methods 
coated in the language of contracts and contacts, reeking of returnable favours’, that Anthony 
Howard described Liverpool as ‘Cook County, UK’ (Kilfoyle, 2000, p. 2). 
The closed nature of Liverpool Labour was evident not just in the council group, but also in the 
local associations. Kilfoyle recalls how he was stopped from joining his local association in the 
1960s, being told that ‘the ward was ‘full up’ and that there was ‘an extended process’ for new 
members wanting to join’, concluding that ‘in Liverpool generally, an attitude prevailed of: ‘Keep 
it closed. Keep it tight. Keep new blood out’’. Again, this is traced back to the Tammany Hall style 
of politics, where influential councillors and MPs kept membership low and exclusive to protect 
their ‘private fiefdoms’ (Kilfoyle, 2000, p. 6).  
This brief outline shows the extent to which the two parties, based on the legacy of sectarianism 
and powerful leaders, led to a political system in the city which was closed off from the majority 
of the public, and actively excluded membership in the case of the Labour Party. It is in this context 
that the Liberals were able to capitalise on dissatisfaction with the two main parties, reaching out 
to those who did not vote and those who voted for other parties out of habit or as a ‘least bad’ 
option – in this case, drawing more support from the Conservatives than Labour, but still affecting 
both parties (Parkinson, 1985, pp.19-20).  
The Liberal rise is impressive not only because it made such significant gains in such a short period 
of time, but because it did so in a city with no strong history of liberalism and a party organisation 
which amounted to a ward, a constituency, and a city-wide party, with positions generally filled by 
the same people (Kilfoyle, 2000, p. 27). Although the groundwork had been laid under Jo 
Grimmond’s leadership, the turn to pavement politics in the local party came following the 
disappointing 1970 general election result when a resolution put forward by the Young Liberals to 
the party’s autumn assembly of that year, which suggested the party ‘focus its campaigning at the 
community level’, was accepted (Dutton, 2013, p. 197). The logic was that success on a local level, 
based on an effort ‘to help organize people in their communities to take and use power… to build 
a Liberal power-base in the major cities of the country… to capture people’s imagination as a 
credible political movement, with local roots and local successes’ would trickle up, into success on 
a constituency level (Dutton, 2013, p. 197). 
Frost and North argue that the move to the pavement politics strategy drew in ‘an energetic new 
wave of activists in the Liberal Party, and in particular, the Young Liberals,’ which ‘began to 
challenge the moribund Labour and Conservative machines’ through this strategy of pavement 
politics, focusing ‘on identifying and meeting local needs, exposing the machines as complacent 
and out of touch at best, corrupt and authoritarian at worst’ (Frost and North, 2013, p. 42). Murden 
concurs, seeing pavement politics ‘a reaction to the national Tory government and the failure of 
the LLP [Liverpool Labour Party] to provide solutions locally… providing ‘a city under fire with 
an analgesic form of local politics’’ (Murden, 2006, p. 452). For Kilfoyle the Liberals were able to 
capitalise on the fact that  
The borough council, in the hands of either Labour or the Conservatives, was failing to 
deliver the most basic and vital of services, particularly street cleaning and refuse 
collection… Most crucially, both parties presided over a redevelopment process in Liverpool 
which had seen large inner-city communities ‘uprooted and transported to outlying housing 
‘bantustans’. 
Further to this, the Labour Party was becoming ‘more introspective… overly concerned with the 
divisions within the Labour group and debates within the Trades’ Council’ whilst the unpopular 
Heath government eroded support for the local Conservatives (Kilfoyle, 2000, p. 27). 
As a strategy, pavement politics involved a number of then-novel campaigning techniques, such 
as the Focus newsletter, which ‘became the hallmark of much local campaigning’ (Stevenson, 1988, 
p. 23). From the perspective of someone involved in the Labour Party, Kilfoyle derides pavement 
politics as ‘cheap confidence tricks’ which deceived a ‘gullible and near-despairing electorate’ 
(Kilfoyle, 2000, p. 30). He describes Focus as a flexible tool used to target each ward with key ultra-
local issues: 
Typically, Focus would include bold headings with variations on the theme of: ‘The Liberals 
have put the pressure on the council and the following things have been done’; whilst 
underneath would be the equally emphatic: ‘We have asked the Labour council about the 
following but still nothing has been done’ (Kilfoyle, 2000, p. 28). 
This represented a new approach to politics in Liverpool – the fact it was not mimicked by their 
rivals was due to differing views on the appropriate role and aims of the local council, rather than 
doubts on its effectiveness as a vote winner. Whilst the Liberals focused on the issues of cracked 
pavements and refuse removal, opponents blasted them for not having a broader vision; Sefton’s 
earthy observation was that ‘They concentrated on bloody pavements when the unemployed were 
walking over them!’ (Kilfoyle, 2000, p. 28). Regardless of Labour’s views, as Weightman argued 
‘By holding up a magnifying glass to the city’s cracked paving stones, and offering ‘community 
politics’ to mend them, the Liberal Party clearly struck a chord more profound than mere 
parochialism’ (Weightman, 1974). 
Traces of the nascent Liberal approach can be seen in various communications with the electorate. 
One the eve of polling in 1967, the Liberal leader – and sole councillor – Cyril Carr focused not 
on ideology or policy, but rather on the claim that ‘For years only shades of emphasis have 
separated the Labour and Tory Machines in Liverpool. No wonder less than one in three of the 
electorate bother to vote at all’, and talk of a ‘Labour/Tory establishment… an artificial battle 
between the twin political juggernauts’ (Liverpool Echo, 10 May 1967). This line was again repeated 
in 1970, almost word for word, with a nod to the rising emphasis on pavement politics by arguing 
‘It has been left to the Liberals to define and fight for the real issues. Liverpool’s streets and 
pavements are dirty and dangerous. We have started a massive campaign to clean up the city. It’s 
about time’ (Liverpool Echo, 6 May 1970). 
Hence, to some extent the rise of the Liberals was due to luck – they were blessed with long term 
social trends which undermined Conservative support and local political parties whose distance 
increased dissatisfaction amongst the electorate and who emphasised grand plans, such as the 
troubled municipally-owned airport or new housing estates, rather than tackling sources of local 
ire. On the other hand, without taking the decision to follow the pavement politics strategy, and 
doing so with such skill and gusto (indeed, when the Labour Party asked the local press why they 
gave so much attention to the Liberals, they were told that they ‘were ringing them up every day 
with a story’), it is unlikely the Liberals would have won the support they did (Kilfoyle, 2000, p. 
29).  
Conclusions 
Whilst it is undeniable that the Liverpool Conservatives faced electoral decline under Thatcher’s 
government, I have argued that the initial causes of this decline in cannot be attributed to the Iron 
Lady herself. Instead, this analysis offers an alternative explanation of Conservative decline in 
Liverpool. Firstly, the erosion of long-term socialisation trends which had typically sustained 
Conservative support, despite the socio-economic structure of Liverpool, meant that people were 
less likely to inherit a strong Conservative identity. However, this alone was not enough to 
guarantee continued decline. Although the Conservatives did suffer as a result of voter 
dissatisfaction with the Heath government, just a few years earlier the Tories had their best post-
war election result and there was nothing to suggest that the typical two-party cycle in Liverpool 
would not continue when Wilson was returned to Downing Street, especially since there was no 
alternative party to vote for in many wards.  
However, the rise of the Liberals and their use of pavement politics allowed the party to gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public, especially on local issues, with Conservative voters disgruntled 
with the Heath government comfortable voting for the Liberals since they were also anti-socialist. 
Furthermore, on a local level those dissatisfied with the lacklustre, unresponsive local party 
machines could also find a home in the Liberals.  
These factors led to the erosion of the Conservative vote share for two reasons. Firstly, the number 
of Conservative voters in the city was lower than Labour’s, but could be relied upon to turn out 
and vote. Thus if the Liberals took equal numbers of Conservative and Labour supporters, then 
the likelihood is that the Conservative vote would decline more as these would have been more 
likely to vote. Secondly, the sudden success of the Liberals in the 1973 local election, when the 
whole council was up for election, created a powerful narrative which placed the Liberals, not the 
Conservatives, as the primary opposition to Labour in many wards. This may not have been the 
case had the elections continued in their traditional, gradual manner of electing just one third each 
year. This narrative prevented the usual cyclical Tory recovery experienced in past years, since 
those who voted Conservative to oppose Labour would now face greater pressure to vote Liberal. 
All of these trends continued during the Thatcher era, but they had their origins well before her 
premiership. 
Thus, the Conservative decline in Liverpool can be attributed to a weakening support base through 
declining socialisation, dissatisfaction with the Heath government, and party machines 
unresponsive to local issues leading to a gap in the electoral market which the Liberals were able 
to exploit through their pavement politics strategy. The Liberals’ sudden success in 1973 allowed 
the party to present itself as the main opposition to Labour, and thus squeeze the Conservative 
vote further. These factors came together in the early 1970s as a perfect storm, and it was not of 
Maggie’s making. 
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 Appendix 1: Turnout and Vote Share in local elections in 
Liverpool 
 
 Vote Share 
 Turnout Conservative  Labour  Liberal  
1945 41.1 44.7 47.5 3.6 
1946 40.4 51.4 44.9 0.9 
1947 48.2 57.4 39.1 0.5 
1949 45.8 53.2 43.1 0.7 
1950 41.2 55.1 41.6 0.7 
1951 40.3 57.4 38.7 0.8 
1952 45.1 44.6 52.7 0.7 
1953 45.5 48.7 46.6 1.0 
1954 41.5 47.7 51.1 0.2 
1955 42.6 51.9 44.7 0.0 
1956 35.4 47.7 49.0 0.7 
1957 35.7 49.5 47.8 1.4 
1958 35.2 45.6 51.4 2.5 
1959 35.6 49.9 43.7 3.1 
1960 28.8 55.9 37.8 3.5 
1961 34.6 52.2 40.7 4.2 
1962 33.5 40.8 48.5 7.8 
1963 38.2 36.6 48.7 12.2 
1964 33.7 41.4 48.4 7.7 
1965 30.7 53.2 38.8 5.5 
1966 26.8 51.6 39.4 6.7 
1967 35.8 57.9 34.9 4.1 
1968 28.5 61.7 25.3 9.8 
1969 29.6 60.1 27.9 7.9 
1970 33.8 47.9 42.2 7.5 
1971 33.7 32.0 53.7 12.5 
1972 43.6 33.0 49.3 15.8 
1973 26.1 26.9 35.4 35.4 
1975 27.8 34.2 31.2 33.0 
1976 32.7 34.1 34.7 30.2 
1978 32.9 36.7 32.8 29.2 
1979 68.2 30.6 40.7 27.9 
1980 25.2 29.4 35.8 32.9 
1982 35.7 25.1 38.8 35.5 
1983 41.6 21.3 45.8 26.1 
1984 49.9 19.1 46.4 34.1 
1986 45.0 12.8 41.4 44.7 
1987 50.2 9.3 43.1 46.2 
1988 42.7 11.7 55.2 30.4 
1990 48.6 7.4 55.7 32.9 
1991 40.4 10.8 37.3 38.2 
1992 31.5 13.0 33.0 38.0 
1994 36.0 6.1 43.8 40.9 
1995 30.6 5.6 47.6 38.0 
1996 27.2 6.4 40.3 39.8 
* Until 1980  Liberal Party candidates 
  1982 - 1987  Lib/SDP and SDP/Lib candidates 
  1988 - 1990  Social and Liberal Democrats candidates 
  1991 onwards Liberal Democrat candidates 
Source data: Rawlings, Thrasher and Ware, 2006. 
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Figure 1 – Party vote share and seat share in local elections in Liverpool, 1945 – 1996.  
Source data: Rawlings, Thrasher and Ware, 2006. 
 
